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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the incentive of the home government to mislead
home consumers by sending misinformation. We find that positive misinformation
on home products and negative misinformation on foreign products always increases
the profit of the home firm, while when the marginal costs of home and foreign firms
are the same, a small amount of positive misinformation decreases the consumer
surplus. Moreover, when the home government maximizes home welfare, it chooses
to send positive misinformation on the home product and negative misinformation
on the foreign product. The stronger is the competition faced by the home firm,
the greater is the amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product. By
contrast, the optimal amount of misinformation on each product used to maximize
world welfare is positive. We also demonstrate that trade liberalization can increases
the incentive of the home government to send misinformation.
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1 Introduction
Governments often try to make consumers believe that domestic products are better than
imported products by disseminating information on the positive aspects of home products.
For example, local and central governments often produce campaigns for home agricultural
products. Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) encourages
consumers to eat locally produced agricultural products.1 The government also began a
project called “Shokuiku”, which means “education on food, health, and traditional food
culture.”2 Although these programs may be important in terms of providing information,
they sometimes emphasize only the positive aspects of home products. In the case of the
campaign noted above, the government says that eating local foods reduces transportation
costs, and thus reduces the environmental burden that would be caused by transportation-
related emissions if consumers chose imported products. However, they seldom provide
information for consumers about how much energy is expended in Japanese agricultural
production.
Governments also send negative information on foreign products: an example is the
case of the Toyota Prius. In 2009, some consumers in the US claimed that the accelerator
and brake of the Prius were defective. In response to this complaint, the US government
took the consumers’ side and criticized Toyota severely, thereby emphasizing the negative
aspect of Toyota vehicles. After sales of Toyota cars dropped suddenly, Toyota incurred
substantial costs in introducing a new braking system, and had to attempt to recover
its reputation. After it was subsequently shown that driver error caused some of the
accidents, the US government declared that Toyota vehicles were safe to drive after all.
It may be difficult for governments to send negative information directly under the
international trade rules, such as those of the World Trade Organization. They, how-
ever, do not need to belittle foreign products directly: there are indirect ways to belittle
foreign products. For example, when an importing country has regulations on the use
1See the website of the MAFF (http://www.maff.go.jp/e/index.html).
2The MAFF website has a PDF file on Shokuiku (http://www.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/shokuiku.pdf).
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of agrochemicals and food additives, the authority inspects both domestically produced
and imported food products. When a certain kind of imported products is found to
contain additives and/or substances which are prohibited to use, the government may ex-
aggeratingly send consumers information not on the risk of taking the imported products
but on the risk of taking those substances. Then, consumers relate the information on
substances to imported products by themselves, and may refrain from purchasing those
products unnecessarily.
Why do governments send this type of information? Do they mislead home consumers
only when they are biased and, accordingly, represent home producers? In this paper,
we examine government incentives to send misinformation that misleads consumers to
purchase products based on perceived, rather than actual, quality. We also examine the
effect of misinformation on home and world welfare. Moreover, we investigate two kinds of
trade-related factors: the scale of the home market and trade liberalization. To this end,
we mainly focus on two types of misinformation: misinformation that makes consumers
believe that home products are better than they actually are, and misinformation that
makes consumers believe that foreign products are of lower quality than they actually are.
In other words, the former praises home products, and the latter belittles foreign products.
These types of government misinformation are likely to cause home bias, inclining home
consumers to purchase home products, but the incentives for purchasing home products
are not based on true utility.
Misinformation has been analyzed in the field of Industrial Organization for several
decades, in which it is treated as misleading advertising. For example, Dixit and Norman
(1978), in using both pre- and post-advertising demands to evaluate welfare, demonstrate
that the market equilibrium level of advertising is excessive under monopoly, oligopoly,
and monopolistic competition. Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) examine the effect of mis-
information on welfare when firms engage in Cournot competition. In particular, they
investigate the effects of different policies, and they derive conditions under which policies
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can increase welfare.3
The problems of asymmetric information have also been examined in the field of In-
ternational Economics. For example, Melkonyan (2005) considers optimal trade policies
for a large country in the presence of asymmetric information. Qiu (1994) also examines
strategic trade policies when the cost of the foreign firm is private information.4 However,
they consider the case in which the foreign variables are private information, and they
design the optimal trade policy for the government of the importing country. Our frame-
work is completely different from those in the literature: in our model, the government
sends misinformation that creates misperception by consumers about the quality of prod-
ucts. As far as we know, there are few studies that deal with the issue of misinformation
created by the government of the importing country.
We find that positive misinformation on home products and negative misinformation on
foreign products always increases the profit of the home firm. However, when the marginal
costs of home and foreign firms are the same, a small amount of positive misinformation
decreases the consumer surplus. A difference in marginal costs can change the result:
when the marginal cost of the foreign firm is lower than that of the home firm, a small
amount of positive misinformation on the home product increases the consumer surplus.
We also find that when the home government maximizes home welfare, it chooses to
send positive misinformation on the home product and negative misinformation on the
foreign product. The stronger is the competition faced by the home firm, the greater is
the amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product. By contrast, the optimal
amount of misinformation on each product used to maximize world welfare is positive.
Moreover, we investigate two important trade-related factors: the home market scale and
trade liberalization. As the scale of the home market increases, the home government
increases both the amount of positive misinformation on the home product and that of
negative misinformation on the foreign product. And, trade liberalization (a reduction in
3Bagwell (2007) provides a survey on the economics of advertising.
4Furusawa et al. (2003) examine tariff and quota policies in the presence of asymmetric information
on the pollution emission of foreign products.
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the tariff rate) increases the incentive of the home government to send misinformation.
We also consider a situation in which certain consumers are smart in the sense that they
are not influenced by misinformation. Then, we find that as the ratio of naive consumers
becomes higher, home welfare increases, and that an increase in the proportion of naive
consumers may benefit smart consumers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model.
In Section 3, we examine the strategic behavior of the home government in sending mis-
information. In Section 4, we investigate the optimal amounts of misinformation for the
home government, and examine which types of misinformation, whether on home prod-
ucts or foreign products, the government prefers. The optimal amount of misinformation
for maximizing world welfare is also examined. In Section 5, we focus on the home mar-
ket scale and trade liberalization. In Section 6, we consider a situation in which smart
consumers exist. In Section 7, we provide concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a country, which is hereafter referred to as the home country, in which consumers
consume home products (Xh), foreign products (Xf ), and the numeraire (M). Xh and Xf
are horizontally differentiated. The perceived utility of the representative home consumer
is given by uˆ = Uˆ(xh, xf , eh, ef ) + m, where xh, xf , and m denote the amounts of con-
sumption of good Xh, Xf , and M , respectively. Moreover, eh and ef denote the degrees
of misperceptions on the home and foreign products, respectively. We consider consumers
to be naive in the sense that they always believe misinformation. Thus, the degree of
misperception is equivalent to the amount of misinformation. Moreover, a positive (resp.
negative) amount of misinformation induces home consumers to perceive the quality of
the product to be higher (resp. lower) than it truly is.
5
Specifically, we consider the following perceived utility function:5
uˆ = (α + eh)xh + (α + ef )xf − β
2
· (x2h + x2f )− γxhxf +m (1)
Note that the evaluation of the true quality is included in α, which is the same for both the
home and foreign products. It is assumed that β > γ ≥ 0, which ensures that the second-
order condition (SOC) holds. We do not consider the spillover effect of misinformation;
the misinformation on the home (resp. foreign) product does not affect the perceived
quality of the foreign (resp. home) product.
Misinformation does not change the true quality of home and foreign products. There-
fore, the true utility is given by u = U(xh, xf ) +m, or:
u = αxh + αxf − β
2
· (x2h + x2f )− γxhxf +m. (2)
Consumers maximize their own utility based on their perceived utility. Therefore, the
utility maximization problem is given by:
Max
xh,xf
uˆ, s.t. phxh + pfxf +m = y + pih,
where ph, pf , y, and pih denote the price of Xh, the price of Xf , exogenous income
(e.g., labor income), and the profit of the home firm, respectively. Treating the prices of
home and foreign products and the profit of the home firm as given, solving the utility
maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions (FOCs):
∂Uˆ
∂xh
− ph = 0, ∂Uˆ
∂xf
− pf = 0. (3)
Consequently, the demand for Xi (i = h, f) is given by:
xDi = x
D
i (ph, pf , eh, ef ) =
(β − γ)α + β(ei − pi)− γ(ej − pj)
β2 − γ2 . (4)
Then, we obtain:
∂xDi
∂pi
= − β
β2 − γ2 < 0,
∂xDi
∂pj
=
γ
β2 − γ2 > 0, i 6= j, (5)
5This formulation and the assumption of naive consumers follow Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) and
Hattori and Higashida (2011), although they take into consideration a positive spillover effect of misin-
formation.
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∂xDi
∂ei
=
β
β2 − γ2 > 0,
∂xDi
∂ej
= − γ
β2 − γ2 < 0, i 6= j. (6)
There is one home firm (firm h) and one foreign firm (firm f). The firms choose prices
to maximize their own profits given the amount of misinformation provided by the home
government.6 The profit functions of these firms are:
pih = (ph − ch) · xDh (ph, pf , eh, ef ), pif = (pf − cf ) · xDf (ph, pf , eh, ef ).
Then, the FOCs for profit maximization are:
∂pih
∂ph
= xDh + (ph − ch) ·
∂xDh
∂ph
= 0,
∂pif
∂pf
= xDf + (pf − cf ) ·
∂xDf
∂pf
= 0.
Thus, we obtain the following equilibrium prices and quantities:
p∗i = p
∗
i (eh, ef , ch, cf )
=
(2β2 − γ2)(α + ei)− βγ(α + ej) + β(2βci + γcj)
4β2 − γ2 , (7)
xD∗i = x
D
i (p
∗
h, p
∗
f , eh, ef ) = x
∗
i (eh, ef , ch, cf )
=
β [(2β2 − γ2)(α + ei − ci)− βγ(α + ej − cj)]
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) , (8)
where i = h, f . Given (5), the SOCs are satisfied.7 It follows from (7) that:
∂p∗i
∂ei
=
2β2 − γ2
4β2 − γ2 > 0,
∂p∗i
∂ej
= − βγ
4β2 − γ2 < 0, (9)
where i, j = h, f and i 6= j. The equilibrium profits are pi∗i = (p∗i − ci) · x∗i .
The creation of misinformation by the home government is costly. Although we focus
mainly on positive misinformation on the home product and negative misinformation on
the foreign product, we define the cost function in a general form: CG,i = CG,i(ei). Because
both positive and negative misinformation are costly, we make the following assumption:
6The results obtained in this paper are not specific to the case in which firms compete on price. Even
if they compete on quantity, the same results are obtained.
7The SOCs are:
∂2pii
∂p2i
= 2
∂xDi
∂pi
< 0,
∂2pih
∂p2h
∂2pif
∂p2f
− ∂
2pih
∂ph∂pf
∂2pif
∂ph∂pf
= 4
(
∂xDi
∂pi
)2
−
(
∂xDi
∂pj
)2
> 0, i 6= j.
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Assumption 1
∂CG,i
∂ei
> 0 (resp. < 0,= 0) if ei > 0 (resp. < 0,= 0),
∂2CG,i
∂e2i
= const. > 0,
∂2CG,i
∂ei∂ej
= 0, i, j = h, f, i 6= j.
Figure 1 illustrates one potential cost function.8 The last equality means that the costs of
both types of misinformation are independent of each other.9 We assume that the greater
is the difference between true and perceived quality, the more costly it is to marginally
increase misperception.
The structure of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the government chooses
the amounts of misinformation. The objective of the home government is to improve or
maximize home welfare, which comprises the consumer surplus based on the true quality
and the profit of the home firm. In the second stage, both the home and foreign firms
choose the prices of their own products. Note that the government knows consumers’
attitudes toward misinformation, the demand structure, and the costs of firms. Each firm
knows consumers’ attitudes toward misinformation, the demand structure, and the cost
of the rival firm.
3 Incentives to Favor the Home Product
We begin with the incentive for the home government to mislead home consumers. Hence,
we investigate the effects of changes in misinformation on the consumer surplus and the
profit of the home firm. Defining the consumer surplus as CSh = U(x
∗
h, x
∗
f )−p∗hx∗h−p∗fx∗f ,
which is based not on perceived but on true quality, home welfare is Wh = CSh + pi
∗
h +
y − CG,h(eh)− CG,f (ef ).10
Using the envelope theorem, the effect of a small increase in ei on the profit of the
8Symmetry about the y-axis is not necessary.
9We assume independence for simplicity. Without this assumption, with the addition of a few condi-
tions on the shapes of the cost functions, the same results are obtained.
10Our results hold even if consumers do not recognize the true quality following consumption. In
practice, consumers often do not realize the true quality for long periods.
8
home firm is given by:
dpi∗h
dei
= (p∗h − ch) ·
{
∂xD∗h
∂pf
∂p∗f
∂ei
+
∂xD∗h
∂ei
}
, i = h, f. (10)
From (5), (6), and (9), it follows that:
∂xD∗h
∂pf
∂p∗f
∂eh
+
∂xD∗h
∂eh
= − γ
β2 − γ2
βγ
4β2 − γ2 +
β
β2 − γ2
=
β
β2 − γ2 ·
(
1− γ
2
4β2 − γ2
)
> 0, (11)
∂xD∗h
∂pf
∂p∗f
∂ef
+
∂xD∗h
∂ef
=
γ
β2 − γ2
2β2 − γ2
4β2 − γ2 −
γ
β2 − γ2
= − γ
β2 − γ2 ·
(
1− 2β
2 − γ2
4β2 − γ2
)
< 0. (12)
Thus, dpi∗h/deh > 0 and dpi
∗
h/def < 0 always hold.
Result 1
Positive (resp. negative) misinformation on the home (resp. the foreign) product always
increases the profit of the home firm.
The effect of a small increase in ei on the consumer surplus is:
dCSh
dei
=
(
∂U
∂xh
− p∗h
)
· ∂x
∗
h
∂ei
+
(
∂U
∂xf
− p∗f
)
· ∂x
∗
f
∂ei
− ∂p
∗
h
∂ei
· x∗h −
∂p∗f
∂ei
· x∗f , (13)
where:
∂x∗i
∂ei
=
∂xD∗i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂ei
+
∂xD∗i
∂pj
∂p∗j
∂ei
+
∂xD∗i
∂ei
=
β(2β2 − γ2)
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) > 0, (14)
∂x∗i
∂ej
=
∂xD∗i
∂pi
∂p∗i
∂ej
+
∂xD∗i
∂pj
∂p∗j
∂ej
+
∂xD∗i
∂ej
= − β
2γ
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) < 0. (15)
When eh = ef = 0, it follows that ∂U/∂xi − p∗i = 0 (i = h, f). Thus, we obtain:
dCSh
dei
∣∣∣∣
eh=ef=0
= −∂p
∗
h
∂ei
· x∗h −
∂p∗f
∂ei
· x∗f . (16)
First, we assume that ch = cf , which means that home and foreign firms are symmetric.
In this case, x∗h = x
∗
f holds when eh = ef = 0. Moreover, from (9) and the assumption
that β > γ ≥ 0, it follows that |∂p∗i /∂ei| >
∣∣∂p∗j/∂ei∣∣ > 0 (i, j = h, f, i 6= j).
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Result 2
If home and foreign firms are symmetric, a small amount of positive misinformation
decreases the consumer surplus.
Contrasting with the result relating to the profit of the home firm, this result holds
whether the misinformation is about the home or foreign product. In other words, a
small amount of negative misinformation increases the consumer surplus. The reason for
this effect is as follows. The effect of ei on pi is greater than that on pj ((9)). When a
small amount of negative misinformation on Xi is generated, the price of Xi falls by more
than the price of Xj increases. Because x
∗
h = x
∗
f when eh = ef = 0, the gain that accrues
from the price of Xi falling exceeds the loss caused by the price of Xj rising.
Second, consider the case of ch > cf . When eh = ef = 0, x
∗
h < x
∗
f holds. The greater
is the difference between the marginal costs, the greater is the difference between the
outputs. Because ∂p∗i /∂ei and ∂p
∗
i /∂ej do not depend on the marginal costs of both firms
((9)), when x∗h < x
∗
f , it is possible that ∂p
∗
h/∂eh · x∗h < −∂p∗f/∂eh · x∗f . Thus, from (16),
we obtain the following result.
Result 3
When the marginal cost of the home firm is higher than that of the foreign firm, a
small amount of positive misinformation on the home product may increase the consumer
surplus. The greater the difference in marginal cost is, the more likely is this to be the
case.
By analogy, we obtain a similar result for the case of ch < cf .
Result 4
When the marginal cost of the home firm is lower than that of the foreign firm, a small
amount of positive misinformation on the foreign product may increase the consumer
surplus. The greater the difference in marginal cost is, the more likely is this to be the
case.
It is interesting that incorporating a difference in marginal costs can change the result
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drastically. Similarly to the symmetric case, the effect of ei on pi is greater than that
on pj (i = h, f, i 6= j). However, in this case, the output of the product whose price
decreases is greater than that of the product whose price increases. Therefore, the benefit
accruing from the price decrease of one product may dominate the loss arising from the
price increase of the other product.
To determine the effect on home welfare, we obtain:
dWh
dei
=
(
∂U
∂xh
− ch
)
∂x∗h
∂ei
+
(
∂U
∂xf
− p∗f
)
∂x∗f
∂ei
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ei
x∗f −
∂CG,i
∂ei
. (17)
∂U/∂xi − ci > 0 (i = h, f) hold when eh = ef = 0. Consequently, given Assumption 1
and equations (9), (14), and (15), we obtain the following result.
Result 5
A small amount of positive (resp. negative) misinformation on the home (resp. foreign)
product improves home welfare.
Now, focusing on a small amount of misinformation, we consider which type of misin-
formation the home government is likely to prefer: positive misinformation on the home
product or negative misinformation on the foreign product.11
When ch = cf , from Results 1 and 2, the interests of the home firm and those of home
consumers conflict with each other in the case of positive misinformation on the home
product, whereas they harmonize with each other in the case of negative misinformation
on the foreign product. Thus, in terms of bringing benefits to both home consumers and
the home firm, the home government prefers belittling the foreign product to praising the
home product. Although naive consumers may not realize the true qualities of products
when consuming them, they may discover their true qualities following consumption.
Moreover, as discussed in Section 6, there may be smart consumers who are not influenced
by misinformation. Thus, it is possible that the home government cares about both the
consumer surplus and the profit of the home firm. On the other hand, when ch > cf ,
11This analysis is relevant when the government has to choose between types of misinformation because
of time and/or budget constraints.
11
from Results 1 and 3, both types of misinformation may benefit both home consumers
and the home firm. Moreover, when ch < cf , neither type of misinformation may be able
to benefit both stakeholders at the same time.
Moreover, (11) and (12) imply that dpi∗/deh > −dpi∗/def . This means that as far
as the effect on the profit of the home firm is concerned, a small amount of positive
misinformation on the home product is more effective than a small amount of negative
misinformation on the foreign product. Thus, when the home government is biased and
represents the profit of the home firm, it is likely to prefer praising the home product to
belittling the foreign product.
A point worth noting is that the effect of positive misinformation about the home
product is different from that of production subsidy. A little positive misinformation on
the home product is likely to increase the profit of the home firm, decrease the consumer
surplus, and improve home welfare. On the other hand, production subsidy increases
both the profit of the home firm and the consumer surplus. Thus, in contrast to the use
of a production subsidy, positive misinformation on the home product can be used by the
government to protect the home firm at the expense of home consumers and the foreign
firm. Using “protectionist” to characterize a government that represents home produc-
ers, a protectionist may prefer to praise the home product, particularly when sending
misinformation is less costly than providing subsidy.
4 The Optimal Amounts of Misinformation
4.1 Home Welfare
When the home government can send both types of misinformation (eh, ef ), what amounts
of misinformation does the government choose? To answer this question, using (1), (2),
and (3), we rewrite (17) as follows:
∂Wh
∂ei
= (p∗h − ch − eh)
∂x∗h
∂ei
− ef
∂x∗f
∂ei
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ei
x∗f −
∂CG,i
∂ei
. (18)
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From (7), (8), (9), (14), and (15), it is clear that ∂x∗i /∂ei, ∂x
∗
i /∂ej, ∂p
∗
i /∂ei, and ∂p
∗
i /∂ej
depend neither on the prices nor the amounts of misinformation, and therefore, we obtain:
∂2Wh(eh, ef )
∂e2h
=
(
∂p∗h
∂eh
− 1
)
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f
∂eh
− ∂
2CG,h
∂e2h
= − β
3
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) −
∂2CG,h
∂e2h
< 0. (19)
Similarly, we obtain:
∂2Wh(eh, ef )
∂eh∂ef
=
∂p∗h
∂ef
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂x
∗
f
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f
∂ef
= −∂x
∗
f
∂eh
=
β2γ
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) > 0, (20)
∂2Wh(eh, ef )
∂e2f
=
∂p∗h
∂ef
∂x∗h
∂ef
− ∂x
∗
f
∂ef
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ef
∂x∗f∂ef −
∂2CG,f
∂e2f
= − β(3β
2 − 2γ2
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) −
∂2CG,f
∂e2f
< 0. (21)
From (19) through (21), we find that the SOCs are satisfied: ∂2Wi/∂e
2
i < 0 (i = h, f),
and ∂2Wh/∂e
2
h · ∂2Wh/∂e2f − (∂2Wh/∂eh∂ef )2 = Ω1 > 0.
From (9), (14), (15), and (18), we obtain the following result.
Result 6
It is optimal for the home government, which maximizes home welfare, to send positive
misinformation on the home product and negative misinformation on the foreign product.
See Appendix A for details. Figure 2 indicates an equilibrium set of both types of misin-
formation. The Rh-curve indicates the optimal amount of eh given ef , and the Rf -curve
indicates the optimal amount of ef given eh.
Now let us consider cost heterogeneity.12 From (7) and (8), it follows that ∂p∗h/∂cf =
βγ/(4β2−γ2), ∂x∗h/∂cf = β2γ/((β2−γ2)(4β2−γ2)), and ∂x∗f/∂cf = −β(2β2−γ2)/((β2−
γ2)(4β2 − γ2)). Thus:
∂2Wh
∂cf∂eh
=
∂p∗h
∂cf
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f
∂cf
= 0
12From (19) through (21), it is clear that the SOCs, which do not depend on the marginal costs, are
satisfied.
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∂2Wh
∂cf∂ef
=
∂p∗h
∂cf
∂x∗h
∂ef
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ef
∂x∗f
∂cf
=
β
4β2 − γ2 > 0.
Thus, a small decrease in cf shifts the Rf -curve in Figure 2 downward.
Result 7
As the marginal cost of the foreign firm decreases, the home government increases the
amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product, and decreases the amount of
positive misinformation on the home product.
As the marginal cost of the foreign firm decreases, the output of the foreign firm increases,
which implies that the effect of the lower price generated by the negative misinformation
about the foreign product becomes greater. Therefore, the home government has a greater
incentive to increase the amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product in
terms of the consumer surplus. Moreover, from (7), it is clear that as the ch−cf increases,
p∗h − ch decreases. Thus, from (10), the home government has less of an incentive to
increase the profit of the home firm by sending positive misinformation on the home
product. This result implies that the stronger is the competition faced by the home firm,
the more severely the home government belittles the foreign product.
In a similar way, we obtain the following:
∂2Wh
∂ch∂eh
=
(
∂p∗h
∂ch
− 1
)
· ∂x
∗
h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f
∂ch
= − β
4β2 − γ2 < 0,
∂2Wh
∂ch∂ef
=
(
∂p∗h
∂ch
− 1
)
∂x∗h
∂ef
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ef
∂x∗f
∂ch
= 0.
Thus, a small increase in ch shifts the Rh-curve in Figure 2 leftward.
Result 8
As the marginal cost of the home firm increases, the home government increases the
amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product, and decreases the amount of
positive misinformation on the home product.
4.2 World Welfare
We investigate whether the same type of misinformation improves world welfare, which
is defined as the sum of home welfare and the profit of the foreign firm: W = CSh+ pi
∗
h+
14
pi∗f + y − CG,h(eh) − CG,f (ef ). Similarly to (18), the FOC for the maximization of world
welfare is:
∂W
∂ei
= (p∗h − ch − eh)
∂x∗h
∂ei
+ (p∗f − cf − ef )
∂x∗f
∂ei
− ∂CG,i
∂ei
= 0. (22)
The SOCs are satisfied (see Appendix B). Because ∂x∗i /∂ei > −∂x∗j/∂ei > 0 (i 6= j) ((14),
(15)), ∂W/∂ei is positive when ch = cf and eh = ef = 0. ∂
2Wh(eh, ef )/∂eh∂ef > 0 holds
((20)) , we record the following result.
Result 9
When the home and foreign firms are symmetric, the amount of misinformation on each
product that is optimal for world welfare is positive.
On the other hand, from (7), it is clear that ∂(p∗i − ci)/∂ci < 0 and ∂(p∗j − cj)/∂ci >
0 (i 6= j) hold, which implies that d2W/dcidei < 0 and d2W/dcjdei > 0 hold. Conse-
quently, the following result is obtained.
Result 10
In terms of world welfare maximization, the higher is the marginal cost of the home (resp.
foreign) firm relative to that of the foreign (resp. home) firm, the greater is the optimal
amount of positive misinformation on the foreign (resp. home) product, and the smaller
is the optimal amount of positive misinformation on the home (resp. foreign) product.
Result 10 contrasts sharply with that relating to the optimal amount of misinformation
for maximizing home welfare. In the present case, the stronger is the competition faced
by the home firm, the more the home government should praise the foreign product to
maximize world welfare. In other words, praising the foreign product is more effective
than praising the home product in simultaneously removing the distortion arising from
insufficient supply and increasing the sum of the firms’ profits. Thus, a home government
that maximizes home welfare chooses an incorrect type of misinformation in terms of
world welfare maximization.
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5 Trade-related Factors and Misinformation Amounts
5.1 The Scale of the Home Market
In this section, we focus on two important trade-related factors. First one is the scale
of the home market. In the context of traditional trade policies, whether a country is
small or large sometimes play an important role in determining the effectiveness of those
policies. In the present context, we consider the home market scale as the “size” of the
country. In particular, we consider the effect of a change in α, which can be considered to
represent the market scale or the true evaluation of the product by consumers. Because
the same results hold for a small amount of each type of misinformation, we focus on the
optimal amount of misinformation.
From (7), (8), it is found that ∂p∗i /∂α = (2β + γ)(β − γ)/(4β2 − γ2) and ∂x∗i /∂α =
β(2β + γ)(β − γ)/((β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2)). Thus, from (18), we obtain:
∂2Wh
∂α∂eh
=
∂p∗h
∂α
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f∂α =
β
4β2 − γ2 ,
∂2Wh
∂α∂ef
=
∂p∗h
∂α
∂x∗h
∂ef
− ∂p
∗
f
∂ef
∂x∗f∂α = −
β
4β2 − γ2 .
Consequently, it follows from (19) through (21) that
deh
dα
=
∂2Wh
∂e2f
∂2Wh
∂α∂eh
+ ∂
2Wh
∂eh∂ef
∂2Wh
∂α∂ef
Ω1
=
β
4β2 − γ2 ·
(
β(
3β + 2γ)
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2) +
∂2CG,f
∂e2f
)
> 0,
def
dα
=
∂2Wh
∂e2h
∂2Wh
∂α∂ef
+ ∂
2Wh
∂eh∂ef
∂2Wh
∂α∂eh
Ω1
= − β
4β2 − γ2 ·
(
β2
(β + γ)(4β2 − γ2) +
∂2CG,h
∂e2h
)
< 0.
Consequently, we obtain the following result.
Result 11
As α, which represents market scale or the true evaluation of the product by consumers,
becomes larger, the home government increases both the amount of positive misinforma-
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tion on the home product (eh) and that of negative misinformation on the foreign product
(−ef ). However, the increase in eh is greater than that in−ef if ∂2CG,f/∂e2f ≥ ∂2CG,h/∂e2h.
An increase in α leads to an increase in the demand for both products given the prices
of home and foreign products. Thus, equilibrium prices and outputs increase. Equation
(10) reveals that these price increases boost the incentive of the home government to
send misinformation on both products: positive misinformation on the home product,
and negative misinformation on the foreign product. However, (11) and (12) state that
the emphasis of home government policy shifts to praising the home product. On the
other hand, from (13), it is likely that the output increase may weaken (resp. strengthen)
the incentive of the home government to send misinformation on the home (resp. foreign)
product. Result 11 means that the price effect dominates the output effect when both
effects conflict with each other in terms of home welfare.
From (8), it follows that ∂x∗i /∂α = −∂x∗i /∂c. Moreover, when ch = cf = c, from (7), it
follows that ∂p∗i /∂α = −(∂p∗i /∂c − 1). Thus, ∂2Wh/∂α∂ei = −∂2Wh/∂c∂ei holds, which
implies the following result.
Result 12
As c becomes smaller, the home government increases the amount of positive misinforma-
tion on the home product (eh) and that of negative misinformation on the foreign product
(−ef ). However, the increase in eh is greater than that in−ef if ∂2CG,f/∂e2f ≥ ∂2CG,h/∂e2h.
5.2 Trade Liberalization and Protectionism
Another important trade-related factor is traditional trade barriers. Does trade liberaliza-
tion of ordinary trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, strengthen the incentive for the
home government to mislead home consumers? Or, does trade liberalization remove the
government’s incentive to send misinformation? In this section, by focusing on the case
of import tariffs, we examine the effect of trade liberalization; we consider a reduction in
tariffs as trade liberalization.
Let t and TR (= tx∗f ) denote the tariff rate and tariff revenue, respectively. The effects
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on the profit of the home firm and the consumer surplus are the same as those in the
previous sections. Home welfare is redefined as follows:
Wh = U(x
∗
h, x
∗
f )− p∗hx∗h − p∗fx∗f + pih + tx∗f + y − CG,h(eh)− CG,f (ef ).
Thus, we obtain:
d(CSh + TR)
deh
∣∣∣∣
eh=0,ef=0
= −∂p
∗
h
∂eh
· x∗h −
∂p∗f
∂eh
· x∗f + t
∂x∗f
∂eh
. (23)
From (15), we know that dx∗f/deh < 0. Thus, the higher is the tariff rate, the greater is
the loss of the tariff revenue following a small increase in the positive misinformation on
the home product. Moreover, when ch > cf , the lower is the tariff rate, the more likely is
ch > cf + t to hold. From Result 3, we obtain the following result.
Result 13
A small amount of positive misinformation on the home product may increase the sum of
the consumer surplus and the tariff revenue. The lower is the tariff rate, the more likely
is this to be the case.
In other words, the more liberalized is trade, the less likely is it that the government must
sacrifice the sum of the consumer surplus and tariff revenue when sending misinformation
to home consumers.
We also obtain:
d(CSh + TR)
def
∣∣∣∣
eh=0,ef=0
= −∂p
∗
h
∂ef
· x∗h −
∂p∗f
∂ef
· x∗f + t
∂x∗f
∂ef
. (24)
From (14), we know that ∂x∗f/∂ef > 0. Thus, the following result is established.
Result 14
A small amount of negative misinformation on the foreign product may increase the sum
of the consumer surplus and the tariff revenue. The lower is the tariff rate, the more likely
is this to be the case.
This result is interesting: trade liberalization strengthens the government’s incentive
to belittle the foreign product. When the tariff rate is high, so is the loss of tariff revenue.
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However, when the tariff rate is low, the loss is small. In this case, trade liberalization
encourages favorable treatment of the home product through informational manipula-
tion. In other words, removing market-oriented trade barriers such as tariffs can increase
nonmarket-oriented trade barriers. In this respect, protectionism is likely to persist.
Similar results are obtained for the optimal amounts of misinformation. The second
partial derivatives are the same as (19), (20), and (21), and the SOCs are satisfied. The
foreign firm considers a tariff as a kind of marginal cost: cf + t = c˜f . Thus, except for
the effect on tariff revenue, the effect of a change in the tariff rate on home welfare is the
same as that of a change in the marginal cost of the foreign firm (cf ). Thus, we obtain:
∂2Wh
∂t∂eh
=
∂x∗f
∂eh
< 0,
∂2Wh
∂t∂ef
=
β
4β2 − γ2 +
∂x∗f
∂ef
> 0.
Thus, the following result is established.
Result 15
As trade is liberalized, the home government, which maximizes home welfare, increases
both positive information on the home product and negative information on the foreign
product.
One point should be noted. Given (23) and (24), it is possible that the home government
sends negative misinformation on the home product and/or positive misinformation on
the foreign product. However, unless the tariff rate is very high, this is unlikely to occur.
Moreover, even in this case, Result 15 holds in the sense that the lower is the tariff rate,
the more likely is it that the home government tends to send positive information on the
home product and negative information on the foreign product.
6 Extension: Existence of Smart Consumers
We have so far considered the situation in which all home consumers are naive. However,
certain consumers might be smart in the sense that they are not influenced by misinfor-
mation and can identify the true quality of products. How does the existence of smart
consumers affect prices and outputs? How are smart consumers influenced indirectly
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by the misinformation sent by the home government? In this section, we answer these
questions. For simplicity, we ignore trade policies, such as tariffs.
Suppose that Nn and N s denote the numbers of naive and smart consumers, respec-
tively. Moreover, δ denotes the ratio of naive consumers: δ = Mn/(Nn + N s). The
demand of a naive consumer for Xi (i = h, f) is given by (4). On the other hand, because
smart consumers are not affected by misinformation, from (2), their demand for each
product is given by:
xDi,smart =
(β − γ)α− βpi + γpj
β2 − γ2 , i = h, f, i 6= j.
Thus, we obtain the following equilibrium price:
p∗i,S = p
∗
i,S(ei, ej, ci, cj)
=
(2β2 − γ2)(α + δei)− βγ(α + δej) + β(2βci + γcj)
4β2 − γ2 , i, j = h, f, i 6= j.(25)
(26)
where subscript S denotes the case in which smart consumers exist. Moreover, the equi-
librium consumption of each smart consumer and total quantity consumed are as follows:
x∗i,smart =
2β2(β − γ)α− 2β3δei + γδ(3β2 − γ2)ej − β(2β2 − γ2)ci + β2γcj
β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2) , (27)
xD∗i,S = x
D
i,S(p
∗
i , p
∗
j , ei, ej) = x
∗
i,S(ei, ej, ci, cj)
= (Nn +N s) ·
(
β [(2β2 − γ2)(α + δei − ci)− βγ(α + δej − cj)]
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2)
)
. (28)
Thus, (25) and (28) states that Results 1 through 12 hold. Moreover, given positive
misinformation on the home product and negative misinformation on the foreign product,
it is easily verified that the larger is δ, then: (a) the higher is the price of the home product;
(b) the lower is the price of the foreign product; (c) the higher is the total consumption
of the home product; and (d) the lower is the total consumption of the foreign product.
What is the effect on home and world welfare? The analyses of the previous sections
show that the existence of naive consumers makes it possible for the home government to
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improve home welfare by misleading home consumers. However, when all consumers are
smart, misinformation cannot change prices and outputs. Thus, we obtain the following
important result.
Result 16
The larger is δ, the greater is home welfare, and the greater is the profit of the home firm.
However, the consumer surplus does not necessarily increase.
On the other hand, when the home government sends misinformation to improve home
welfare, world welfare deteriorates. Thus, it is clear that the larger is δ, the lower is world
welfare.
We also consider the effect of misinformation on smart consumers. ∂U/∂xi − p∗i = 0
always holds for smart consumers. Therefore, misinformation can affect the consumer
surplus of smart consumers only indirectly through changes in prices:
∂CSh,smart
∂ei
= −N s
(
∂p∗h,S
∂ei
· x∗h,smart +
∂p∗f,S
∂ei
· x∗f,smart
)
. (29)
Thus, for a small amount of misinformation, the effect of misinformation on smart con-
sumers is the same as that on naive consumers.
Moreover, when considering the optimal situation for the home government, from the
definition of the consumer surplus, it follows that:
dCSh,smart
dδ
= −N s
(
dp∗h,S
dδ
· x∗h,smart +
dp∗f,smart
dδ
· x∗f,smart
)
,
where
dp∗i,S
dδ
=
∂p∗i,S
∂δ
+
∂p∗i,S
∂eh
deh
dδ
+
∂p∗i,S
∂ef
def
dδ
.
The greater the ratio of naive consumers is, the stronger incentive the home government
has to send both positive misinformation on the home product and negative misinforma-
tion on the foreign product, which implies that deh/dδ > 0 and def/dδ < 0. Therefore, it
follows from (25) that dp∗h/dδ > 0 and dp
∗
f/dδ < 0. Thus, it is possible that an increase in
the proportion of naive consumers benefits smart consumers. In particular, this is more
likely when x∗f,S > x
∗
h,S than when x
∗
f,S ≤ x∗h,S.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the incentive of the home government to mislead home con-
sumers by sending misinformation.
First, we investigated the basic incentive of the home government to send misinfor-
mation. We found that an increase in positive (resp. negative) misinformation on the
home (resp. foreign) product increases the profit of the home firm. On the other hand,
a small amount of either type of positive misinformation decreases the consumer sur-
plus when both firms are symmetric. Thus, a little positive misinformation on the home
product generates a conflict of interest between home consumers and the home firm. We
also found that a difference between domestic and foreign marginal costs can change how
misinformation affects the consumer surplus.
Second, we considered the optimal amounts of both types of misinformation, and
demonstrated that the home government, which maximizes home welfare, chooses a pos-
itive (resp. negative) amount of misinformation on the home (resp. foreign) product. By
contrast, the optimal amount of misinformation on each product, which maximizes world
welfare, is positive.
Third, we considered two kinds of trade-related factors: the scale of the home market
and trade liberalization. An increase in the scale of the home market causes the home
government to shift its policy emphasis from belittling the foreign product to praising
the home product. Moreover, when trade is liberalized, the government has a stronger
incentive to send misinformation. Therefore, when misinformation can be used as a
protectionist device, which is a substitute for ordinary trade policies, such as tariffs and
quotas.
Fourth, as extensions, we considered the case in which smart consumers exist. We
demonstrated that the larger is the proportion of naive consumers, the greater is home
welfare, but the lower is world welfare. Moreover, we found that an increase in the ratio
of naive consumers may benefit smart consumers.
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By setting up a simple duopoly model, we derived interesting results relating to the
home government’s use of misinformation, which can be thought of as nontariff trade
policies. We did not address other interesting issues. Misinformation may have spillover
effects because sending positive misinformation on the home product may increase or
decrease the perceived quality of the foreign product. When positive misinformation is
seen as a type of general advertising, consumers may be more inclined to purchase the
product whether it is domestic or imported. On the other hand, if misinformation on
the home product is seen as a kind of hostile advertising, consumers may be less inclined
to buy foreign goods. Analysis of this government behavior and the associated welfare
effects is a task for future research.
Appendix A
This Appendix provides the details for Result 6. Suppose that ef = 0. Then, the condition
for the optimal misinformation on the home product is given by ∂Wh/∂eh|ef=0 = 0.
From Assumption 1 and (18), the optimal information is positive because p∗h − ch > 0,
∂x∗h/∂eh > 0, and ∂p
∗
f/∂eh < 0. Let e˘h denote this amount (See Figure 2).
Note that ∂x∗h/∂ef < 0 and ∂p
∗
f/∂ef > 0. From (7) and (8), when eh = ef = 0,
(p∗h − ch)
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
x∗f = −(p∗h − ch)
∂x∗h
∂ef
+
∂p∗f
∂ef
x∗f ,
holds, which implies that
∂Wh
∂eh
∣∣∣∣
eh=ef=0
=
∂Wh
∂ef
∣∣∣∣
eh=ef=0
.
Moreover, from (18), we obtain that
d2Wh
de2h
∣∣∣∣
ef=0
+
∂2CG,h
∂e2h
=
(
∂p∗h
∂eh
− 1
)
∂x∗h
∂eh
− ∂p
∗
f
∂eh
∂x∗f
∂eh
< −
(
∂p∗h
∂eh
− 1
)
∂x∗h
∂ef
+
∂p∗f
∂ef
∂x∗f
∂eh
= − d
2Wh
dehdef
∣∣∣∣
ef=0
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< 0. (30)
Because C ′G,f (0) = 0 and ∂
2CG,h/∂e
2
h > 0 from Assumption 1, these inequalities imply
that dWh/def < 0 when (eh, ef ) = (e˘h, 0).
Similarly, from the analysis in Section 3, when eh = 0, the optimal information on
the foreign product is negative for the home government that maximizes home welfare
(ef < 0). Let e˘f in Figure 2 denote this amount. From (18), we obtain that
d2Wh
de2f
∣∣∣∣∣
eh=0
+
∂2CG,f
∂e2f
< − d
2Wh
dehdef
∣∣∣∣
eh=0
< 0. (31)
Because C ′G,h(0) = 0 and ∂
2CG,f/∂e
2
f > 0 from Assumption 1, these inequalities imply
that dWh/deh > 0 when (eh, ef ) = (0, e˘f ). Thus, we obtain Result 6.
Appendix B
From (22), it is obtained that:
∂2W
∂e2i
+
∂2CG,i
∂e2i
=
(
∂p∗i
∂ei
− 1
)
∂x∗i
∂ei
+
∂p∗j
∂ei
∂x∗j
∂ei
= − β
3(4β2 − 3γ2)
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2)2 < 0, i 6= j
∂2W
∂ej∂ei
=
(
∂p∗i
∂ei
− 1
)
∂x∗i
∂ej
+
∂p∗j
∂ei
∂x∗j
∂ej
= − β
2γ3)
(β2 − γ2)(4β2 − γ2)2 > 0. i 6= j
Thus, it is easily verified that:
d2W
de2h
d2W
de2f
−
(
d2W
dehdef
)2
> 0.
Thus, the SOCs are satisfied.
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